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Research in cooperative games often assumes that agents know the coalitional values with certainty,
and that they can belong to one coalition only. By contrast, this work assumes that the value of a coali-
tion is based on an underlying collaboration structure emerging due to existing but unknown relations
among the agents; and that agents can form overlapping coalitions. Specifically, we first propose Re-
lational Rules, a novel representation scheme for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions,
which encodes the aforementioned relations, and which extends the well-known MC-nets represen-
tation to this setting. We then present a novel decision-making method for decentralized overlapping
coalition formation, which exploits probabilistic topic modeling—and, in particular, online Latent
Dirichlet Allocation. By interpreting formed coalitions as documents, agents can effectively learn
topics that correspond to profitable collaboration structures.
1 Introduction
Cooperative game theory [7] provides a rich framework for the coordination of the actions of self-
interested agents. Despite the maturity of the related literature, it is usually assumed that an agent can be
a member of exactly one coalition. Nevertheless, in many real-world scenarios this is simply not realistic.
In environments where agents hold an amount of a divisible resource (e.g., time, money, computational
power), which they can invest to earn utility, it is natural for them to divide that resource in order to
simultaneously participate in a number of overlapping coalitions [27, 9, 6, 35, 36, 37, 24], to maximize
their profits.
As real-world environments exhibit a high level of uncertainty, it is more natural than not to assume
that agents do not have complete knowledge of the utility that can be yielded by every possible team
of agents [28, 21, 5, 16]. Moreover, coalitional value is often determined by an underlying structure
defined given relations among the members of the coalition. These relations reflect the synergies among
the coalition members. It is natural to posit that agents do not know the exact synergies at work in
their coalitions. Against this background, in our system the coalitional value depends on the amount of
resources the agents invest, and, crucially, the explicit relations among coalition members. As such, we
build on the idea of marginal contribution nets (MC-nets) [15] and introduce Relational Rules (RRs), a
representation scheme for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions. The RR scheme allows for the
concise representation of the synergies-dependent coalition value.
Now, an agent can make an observation of the utility that can be earned by the resource offerings of
the members of a coalition, but it is a much more complex task to determine her relations with subsets of
agents of that coalition. Probabilistic topic modeling (PTM) [3] is a form of unsupervised learning which
is particularly suitable for unravelling information from massive sets of documents. Probabilistic topic
models infer the probability with which each word of a given “vocabulary” is part of a topic. Intuitively,
the words that have high probability in a topic, are very likely to appear together in a document that refers
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2 Overlapping Coalition Formation via Probabilistic Topic Modeling
to this topic with high probability. Therefore, a topic, which is essentially a probability distribution of
the words of a given vocabulary, reveals the underlying hidden structure. One of the most popular PTM
algorithms [3] is online Latent Dirichlet Allocation (online LDA) [12], which, as its name indicates,
is a an online version of the well-known Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [4] algorithm. LDA is a
generative probabilistic model for sets of discrete data, while online LDA can handle documents that
arrive in streams, enabling the continuous evolution of the topics.
The method we develop employs online LDA to allow agents to learn how well they can cooperate
with others. In our setting, agents repeatedly form overlapping coalitions, as the game takes place over a
number of iterations. Thus, we utilize a simple, yet appropriate, protocol, under which in each iteration
an agent is (randomly) selected in order to propose (potentially) overlapping coalitions. Agents that use
our method take decisions on which coalitions to join by exploiting the topics of the model that they have
learned via employing online LDA: by interpreting formed coalitions as documents, represented given an
appropriate vocabulary, agents are able to use online LDA to update beliefs regarding the hidden collab-
oration structure—and thus implicitly learn rewarding synergies with others (synergies which are in our
experiments described by RRs). Moreover, agents are able to gain knowledge regarding coalitions that
are costly, and should thus be avoided. Hence, agents can, over time, pick partners with which to cooper-
ate effectively. We have evaluated our approach against two reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms we
developed for this setting, and which serve as baselines. Our algorithm vastly outperforms the baselines,
implying a high degree of accuracy in the beliefs of the agents, and a high quality of agent decisions.
To the best of our knowledge, the recent work of [24] is the only one that has so far approached
overlapping coalition formation under uncertainty, but it is concerned with the class of Threshold Task
Games [6], which greatly differs to the more general setting we study here. Moreover, ours is the first
paper that employs probabilistic topic modeling for multiagent learning: existing literature on multiagent
learning [11, 32], in both non-cooperative [23, 13, 14] and cooperative [21, 22, 5, 2] game settings,
is largely preoccupied with the study of RL, PAC learning, or simple belief updating algorithms. As
such, this paper introduces an entirely novel paradigm for (decentralized) learning employed by rational
autonomous decision makers in multiagent settings.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we provide an overview of previous work on overlapping coalition formation, multiagent
learning and agent decision-making under uncertainty. Furthermore, we offer the necessary background
on Probabilistic Topic Modeling, and in particular (online) Latent Dirichlet Allocation—which is em-
ployed in our proposed agent-learning method.
2.1 Overlapping Coalition Formation
Overlapping coalition formation was initially studied in [27], which provided an approximate solution to
the corresponding optimal coalition structure generation problem [26], in a setting where the costs of the
coalitions and the capabilities of the agents are globally announced. The method proposed in [27] em-
ploys concepts from combinatorics and approximation algorithms. Though related, our approach differs
in that it is decentralized, since the (overlapping) coalitions are formed by the agents themselves, and
are not provided for the agents by an algorithm. The subsequent work of [9] presented an application of
overlapping coalitions in sensor networks. An approximate greedy algorithm with worst-case guarantees
is introduced, and constitutes a real-world example of employing overlapping coalitions. However, in
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that work, the agents do not form coalitions acting in a completely autonomous manner, since they are,
at a step of the algorithm, hardwired to agree on taking a specific action (regarding the choice of the
members of the coalition).
As illustrated by the work of [6] which formally introduced cooperative games with overlapping
coalitions (or OCF games), whenever an agent can be part of a number of coalitions simultaneously,
coalition structures are much more complex than in non-OCF games—and so is the concept of deviation.
We provide a further discussion on the richness of OCF games later in Section 8 of this paper. Further-
more, in [6] an expressive class of OCF games, threshold task games (TTGs), is also presented. In TTGs,
a coalition achieves a task and earns utility u if its members manage to collect a number of resource units
which exceeds a threshold T > 0.
TTGs provide the framework of study for the work of [24]. In that work, probability bounds for the
resources contributed by members of overlapping coalitions are computed, and subsequently exploited to
form (overlapping) coalitions that are deemed, with some probabilistic confidence, capable of carrying
over assigned tasks since they are believed to possess resources exceeding the required threshold. The
paper uses Bayesian updating to update agent beliefs regarding partners’ resources following coalition
formation and task execution, but no actual machine learning technique is used in that work.
In a series of works [35, 36, 37] following [6], Zick and colleagues study stability [7] with respect
to the behaviour of non-deviating players towards deviators in OCF settings. Several variants of the core
are developed, and the approach is based on the notion of arbitration functions, which define the payoff
of the deviators according to the attitude of the non-deviators.
A class of games highly related to cooperative games with overlapping coalitions, is that of fuzzy
coalitional games [1]. In a fuzzy game, an agent can be part of a coalition at various levels. Thus,
the coalitional value of C ⊆ N is defined by the level at which the agents have joined C. There is a
number of differences between overlapping coalition formation and fuzzy games, the biggest one being
that in fuzzy games the core is the only acceptable outcome. Finally, coalition structure generation with
overlapping coalitions is studied in [34], where a metaheuristic is developed, based on particle swarm
optimization [10].
2.2 Uncertainty and Learning
Stochasticity in the value of payoffs in non-overlapping cooperative games has been studied in [28], in
a setting where agents have different preferences over a set of random variables. The focus of that study
is on core-stability. Bayesian coalitional games are introduced in [16], where suitable variations of the
core are also defined. In [21, 22] agents have incomplete information regarding the costs that the other
agents incur by performing a task within a coalition, while the formation of the coalitions takes place
through information-revealing negotiations and the conduction of auctions. The formation of overlapping
coalitions is not allowed in [21, 22].
One of the very early attempts in approaching learning in cooperative settings was presented in [8],
where the dynamics of a set of RL algorithms [29] were studied. A Bayesian approach to reinforcement
learning for coalition formation is presented in [5], along with the introduction of a variation of the
core. The more recent work of [2] explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) model for obtaining
theoretical predictions for the value of coalitions that have not been observed in the past. The links
between evolutionary game theory and multiagent reinforcement learning is the topic of study in [31, 19].
Multi-agent learning in non-cooperative games [11] has been studied for a longer time. Much of the
early seminal work [23, 13, 14] is interested in the study of Q-learning algorithms and their convergence
to Nash equilibria [25]. In particular, the algorithm presented in [13] is shown to converge to a Nash
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equilibrium if every state and action has been visited infinitely often and the learning rate satisfies some
conditions regarding the values it takes over time. Overall, the literature on multiagent learning [32],
in both cooperative and non-cooperative settings, is largely concerned with the study of reinforcement
learning algorithms.
2.3 Probabilistic Topic Modeling
Probabilistic topic models (PTMs) consist of statistical methods that analyze words of documents, in
order to discover the topics (or themes) to which these refer to, and the ways the topics interconnect. One
hugely popular and successful PTM is the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [4].
2.3.1 Latent Dirichlet Allocation
We begin by defining basic terms, following [4, 3]:
• A word is the basic unit of discrete data. A vocabulary consists of words and is indexed by
{1,2, . . . ,V}, while it is fixed and has to be known to the LDA.
• A document is a series of L words, denoted by w = (w1,w2, . . . ,wL), where the lth word is denoted
by wl .
• A corpus is a collection of M documents, denoted by D = {w1,w2, . . . ,wM}.
• A topic is a distribution over a vocabulary.
LDA is a Bayesian probabilistic model, the intuition behind it being that a document is a mixture of
topics. For each document w in D, LDA assumes a generative process where a random distribution over
topics is chosen, and for each word in w a topic is chosen from that topics’ distribution, finally choosing
a word from that topic. Documents share the same set of topics, but exhibit topics in different portions.
While LDA observes only series of words, its objective is to discover the topic structure which is
hidden. It is thus assumed that the generative process includes latent variables. The topics are β1:K ,
where K is their number; each topic βk is a distribution over the vocabulary, where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}; and
βkw is the probability of word w in topic k. For the dth document the topic proportion of topic k is θdk,
as θd is a distribution over the topics. The topic assignments for the dth document are denoted by zd ,
with zdl being the topic assignment for the lth word of the dth document. Thus, β ,θ and z are the latent
variables of the model, while the only observed variable is w, where wdl is the lth word observed in the
dth document. Given the documents, the posterior of the topic structure is:
p(β1:K ,θ1:D,z1:D | w1:D) = p(β1:K ,θ1:D,z1:D,w1:D)p(w1:D)
where the computation of p(w1:D), the probability of seeing the given documents under any topic struc-
ture, is intractable [3]. Furthermore, LDA introduces priors, so that βk∼Dirichlet(η) and θd ∼Dirichlet(α).
Though the exact computation of the posterior, and thus the topic structure as a whole, cannot be
efficiently computed, it can be approximated [4]. The two most prominent alternatives for this are Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling methods [18] and variational inference [17].
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In variational inference for LDA, the true posterior is approximated by a simpler distribution q that
depends on parameters (matrices) φ1:D, γ1:D and λ1:K , defined as follows:
φdwk ∝ exp{Eq[log θdk]+Eq[log βkw]}
γdk = α+∑
w
ndwφdwk
λkw = η+∑
d
ndwφdwk
The variable ndw is the number of times that word w has been observed in document d. Parameters
γ1:D and λ1:K are associated with ndw, while φdwk denotes the probability (under distribution q) that the
topic assignment of word w in document d is k [4]. The variational inference algorithm minimizes the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between the variational distribution and the true posterior. This is achieved
via iterating between assigning values to document-level variables and updating topic-level variables.
2.3.2 Online Latent Dirichlet Allocation
In online LDA [12], documents can arrive in batches (streams), and the value of λ1:K is updated through
analyzing each batch of documents. The variable ρt = (τ0+t)−κ controls the rate at which the documents
of batch t impact the value of λ1:K . Furthermore, the algorithm (Alg. 1) requires an estimation, at least,
of the total number of documents D, in case this is not known in advance. The values of α and η can be
assigned once and remain fixed. Essentially, the probability of word w in topic βk, can be estimated as
βkw = λkw/∑λk.
Algorithm 1: Online Variational Inference for LDA [12].
1 Initialize λ randomly
2 for t = 1 to ∞ do
3 ρt = (τ0+ t)−κ
4 E step :
5 Initialize γtk randomly
6 repeat
7 Set φtwk ∝ exp{Eq[logθtk]+Eq[logβkw]}
8 Set γtk = α+∑w ntwφtwk
9 until 1K ∑k |change in γtk|< ε;
10 M step :
11 Compute λ˜kw = η+Dntwφtwk
12 Set λ = (1−ρt)λ +ρt λ˜
3 Relational Rules
Agents have to form coalitions under what we term structural uncertainty. This notion describes the
uncertainty agents face regarding the value of synergies among them. Such synergies are, in a non-
overlapping setting, concisely described by marginal contribution nets (MC-nets). In MC-nets, coali-
tional games are represented by a set of rules of the form Pattern→ value, where Pattern is a conjunction
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of literals (representing the participation or absence of agents), and applies to coalition C if C satisfies
Pattern, with value ∈ R being added to the coalitional value of C.
We now extend MC-nets to overlapping environments by introducing Relational Rules (RR), with
the following form:
A→ ∑i∈Apii,C|A| · value
where A ⊆ N (with N = {1, . . . ,n} being the set of agents), value ∈ R; C ⊆ N is a coalition such that
A⊆C; pii,C is the portion of her resource that i has invested in coalition C: i.e., pii,C = ri,C/ri, where ri is
the total resource quantity (continuous or discrete) that i holds and ri,C is the amount she has invested in
C. Therefore, pii,C > 0, since i ∈C (ri,C = 0 essentially means that i /∈C), and pii,C ≤ 1, since i can offer
to C at most ri.
A rule applies to coalition C if and only if A ⊆ C, and in that case utility ∑i∈A pii,C|A| · value is added
to the coalitional value of C. Note that it is not required that an agent’s total resource quantity ri has to
be communicated to C’s other members, since a rule is applied by the environment. In non-overlapping
games, RRs reduce to MC-nets rules without negative literals, as it then holds that ∑i∈A pii,C|A| = 1.
Example 1. Assume that N = {1,2,3}, r1 = 10,r2 = 8, r3 = 6, and the Relational Rules of the game are:
(1) : {1}→ pi1,C ·100
(2) : {1,2}→ pi1,C +pi2,C
2
· (−50)
(3) : {2,3}→ pi2,C +pi3,C
2
·50
Let coalition C1 = {1,2} form, with r1,C1 = 5 (pi1,C1 = 0.5) and r2,C1 = 8 (pi2,C1 = 1). The value of
uC1 will be determined by rules (1) and (2), since rule (3) does not apply, as agent 3 /∈C1. Applying rule
(1) to C1 will result in value pi1,C · 100 = 0.5 · 100 = 50 and applying rule (2) to C1 will result in value
pi1,C1+pi2,C1
2 · (−50) = 0.5+12 · (−50) =−37.5. Thus, uC1 = 50−37.5 = 12.5.
In our setting, the value of a coalition is determined through RRs, but agents do not know the RRs in
effect, and hence cannot determine the value of a coalition with certainty. Thus, agents do not know how
well they can do with others, and cannot determine their relations just by an observation of a coalitional
value. However, in Section 4 we show how PTMs can be exploited so that agents learn the underlying
RR-described collaboration structure.
4 Learning by Interpreting Coalitions as Documents
In this section, we present how agents can employ online LDA in order to effectively learn the underlying
collaboration structure. We let each agent maintain and train her own online LDA model. Thus, there are
n such models in the system. The agents’ formation decision-making process (Section 5) employs the
learned topics.
For each (possibly overlapping) coalition C ⊆ N formed,1 i ∈C, i observes the earned utility uC. The
contribution ri,C of agent i to coalition C is known to each other agent j ∈C \ i, once C is successfully
1Note that to improve readability we use the set notation “C ⊆ N” to refer to coalitions that can in reality be overlapping:
these are in fact vectors of the resource quantities that each agent contributes to this coalition, i.e. a coalition is a r = 〈r1, ·,rn〉
vector [6].
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formed. However, in order to supply that information to her online LDA model, an agent must maintain
a vocabulary. We define the vocabulary of an agent to include n words, one for each agent (including
herself), indicating their contribution, plus two words for the utility, one representing gain and the other
representing loss, since the value earned from a coalition can be either positive or negative. Therefore, the
vocabulary of an agent consists of n+2 words. Assuming a game that proceeds in rounds, in round t agent
i interprets the coalitional configuration regarding C, i ∈C, as a document by “writing” in the document
the word that indicates the contribution of agent j ∈C r j,C times—where r j,C ∈ N+ is the contribution
of j to C. The restriction of the resource contributions of agents to positive (r j,C = 0⇒ j /∈ C) natural
numbers is thus necessary when LDA is used, since a word can only appear in a document a discrete
number of times. Thus, agent i “writes” in the document, that corresponds to C, either the word that
indicates gain or the one that indicates loss as many times as the absolute value of the utility earned
by the coalition is.2 Since words are discrete data, uC cannot be real-valued; so, we let the actual value
earned by C be buCc, instead of the uC computed by the application of the RRs related to C. The number
of documents that an agent passes in an iteration (round) to her online LDA is equal to the number of
coalitions that she is member of.
Example 2. Let an agent’s vocabulary include the words “ag1”, “ag2”, “gain” and “loss”, corresponding
respectively to agents’ 1 and 2 contribution and the positive and negative utility. Thus, for coalition C =
{1,2} where r1,C = 3, r2,C = 1, and uC = −3, each agent i ∈C forms the document:
w= (“ag1”, “ag1”, “ag1”, “ag2”, “loss”, “loss”, “loss”)
Example 3. Following Example 2, let also agent 3 participate in the game, and so an agent’s vocabulary
includes the words “ag1”, “ag2”, “ag3”, “gain” and “loss”, with the corresponding meaning of each being
as defined in Example 2. Now, for coalition C = {1,2,3} where r1,C = 1, r2,C = 1, r3,C = 2, and uC = 4,
each agent i ∈C forms the document:
w= (“ag1”, “ag2”, “ag3”, “ag3”, “gain”, “gain”, “gain”, “gain”)
Since LDA is a “bag-of-words” model, the order of the words in the document does not matter.
The batch of documents the online LDA model of agent i is supplied with at iteration t, consists of the
interpreted-as-documents coalitions i has joined at t. The intuition behind the notion of a topic is that
the words that appear in it with high probability are very likely to appear together in a document that
exhibits this topic with high probability. Thus, the probability with which the word corresponding to an
agent’s contribution appears in a topic, is correlated with the amount of her contribution. Therefore, the
meaning of a topic identified by agent i, is that i has observed in many documents certain agents who
contributed a lot, and some that contributed less; and this configuration results to gain or loss with the
corresponding probabilities.
2The number of times that the word for utility is written may require scaling when its domain ranges from very low to very
high values.
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(a) A “profitable” learned topic.
(b) A “non-profitable” learned topic.
Figure 1: Typical topics, as formed by a randomly selected agent at the end of a random iteration in an
experiment, where an agent’s vocabulary consists of 52 words (n = 50). The two last words in a topic
indicate the probability of gain and loss respectively, while the rest correspond to agents’ contribution.
In (a), the “profitable” learned topic, the word for loss appears with near-zero probability; in (b), the
“non-profitable” topic, the word for gain has near-zero probability.
Thus, the topic in Fig. 1(a) implies that if i joins a coalition with the agents that appear in the topic
with high probability, then that coalition would be profitable. On the other hand, the topic in Fig. 1(b)
implies that forming a coalition with the agents that appear in it with high probability would result in loss.
Note that learning a topic’s profitability corresponds to acquiring information on the RRs associated with
that topic. However, these RRs are not explicitly learned; what is learned is the underlying collaboration
structure (which might, in the general case, be generated by means other than RRs). It is natural to
expect that agents who appear with (relatively) high probability in a topic which has been associated
with loss, like the one in Fig. 1(b), will not appear (as a group) with high probability in a topic that
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has been associated with gain, like the one in Fig. 1(a). Such occurrence would reflect that an agent’s
beliefs indicate that cooperation with a group of agents is (paradoxically) both beneficial and harmful.
Furthermore, as an agent observes documents that always include the word that corresponds to her own
contribution, it is expected that her corresponding word will have a non-trivial probability in her topics.
5 Taking Formation Decisions
We now present OVERPRO, a method for agent decision-making in iterated OVERlapping coalition for-
mation games, via PRObabilistic topic modeling (here, online LDA).
5.1 A Repeated OCF Protocol
The protocol of our game operates in I iterations (rounds). At the beginning of an iteration one agent
is randomly selected, from the set of agents N = {1, . . . ,n}, as the proposer. Then, this agent proposes
a number of (overlapping) coalitions, where for each such coalition she offers an integer quantity of
her resource and asks for a (possibly different) resource quantity from each agent of each coalition.
Therefore, proposer i ∈ N is asked to pass a list of tuples of the form 〈demandsC,ri,C〉, where demandsC
is an n-dimensional vector whose jth entry denotes the (integer) resource quantity that the proposer asks
from agent j for joining C, and ri,C ∈ N+ denotes the amount of resource that i offers to coalition C.
Naturally, if the proposer does not ask from j to participate in C, then the jth entry of demandsC is 0. By
limiting the agents’ resource investments to discrete quantities we disallow the formation of an infinite
number of coalitions. Then, every agent j ∈ N \ i is a responder and gets informed of the proposals in
which she is involved, while she has to respond to each such proposal by either accepting (and thus
offering the requested resource quantity) or rejecting it. A (possibly overlapping) coalition C forms if
and only if all involved agents accept to participate in it.
At the end of each round, all coalitions are dissolved and the resources of the agents are replenished.
This removes the need for long-term strategic reasoning by the agents—and thus removes unnecessary
distractions from the study of the effectiveness of the method used for learning the collaboration structure
(which is what we focus on in this paper).
The utility ui,C that i ∈C earns from coalition C is proportional to her ri,C contribution, i.e., ui,C =
uC · ri,C/∑ j∈C r j,C, where uC is the total utility earned by the coalition.3 An agent receives information
regarding partners’ contributions to, and the total coalitional utility of, her own formed coalitions only.
5.2 The OVERPROMethod
The main idea behind OVERPRO is that an agent exploits her learned LDA topic model for profitable
coalition formation. Specifically, by considering as “profitable” (“non-profitable”) the topics in which
the probability of gain (loss) is higher than the probability of loss (gain), the agent can identify coalitions
that will potentially result in gain (loss). Now, it might be that not all of the topics are significant, in the
sense that they are not clearly profitable or harmful. This is because some of them might not be well
formed (especially at the early iterations of the game). We define a topic to be significant if the absolute
value of the difference between the probability of the word representing gain and the probability of the
word representing loss is greater than ε . Therefore, the significant topics of agent i are:
ST i←{k : |β ik,′gain′−β ik,′loss′ |> ε}
3The use of more elaborate reward allocation methods is interesting future work.
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where β ik is the k
th (out of the K) topic of agent i. Furtheremore, we define Good (profitable) topics as the
ones in which the probability of the word representing gain is greater than that of the word representing
loss, and are significant. Bad topics are defined analogously. Formally:
Goodi←{k : β ik,′gain′ > β ik,′loss′ ∧ k ∈ ST i}
Badi←{k : β ik,′gain′ < β ik,′loss′ ∧ k ∈ ST i}.
How much probability should an agent appear with in a topic in order for the agent to be considered
significant for that topic? For instance, in Fig. 1(a) not all agents appear in the profitable topic with
similar probability values. Note that, due to initialization of Dirichlet distributions, each word appears
in a topic with positive probability, no matter how small. We define the significant agents of topic k of
agent i, denoted as SAik, as those whose corresponding words in topic k have probability higher than the
mean value µ of the probabilities of the words corresponding to agents, plus the standard deviation σ of
those. Formally:
SAik←{ j : β ik, j > µ(β ik,N)+σ(β ik,N)∧ j ∈ N \ i}
Given the above, the approach of OVERPRO is that a proposer i proposes one coalition for every topic
k ∈ Goodi (proposing just the one coalition corresponding to the most profitable topic is risky, since
a single rejection would mean formation failure), with the proposed members of the coalition stem-
ming from topic k being SAik. Then, the resource quantity ri,C offered to C by i is proportional to
β ik,i ·(β ik,′gain′−β ik,′loss′), where k is the topic in which coalition C was identifibed as profitable. Thus, a pro-
poser’s contribution to a coalition is affected by both his effect on the corresponding topic, and the prof-
itability of this topic. The proposer i asks from agent j ∈C to offer to C the quantity r j,C = ri,C ·β ik, j/β ik,i,
since i assumes that others will respond according to the topics that i has observed.
Now, an agent often faces the dilemma to either exploit her best-so-far action, or explore different
options [29]. We deal with this issue by allowing agent i to do both at the same time, since ri is divisible.
Specifically, at iteration t proposer i dedicates zt ∈ (0,1) of ri in exploring and 1− zt in exploiting (with
the exploitation part defined as described above). Then, an agent performs exploration by proposing
to bri · ztc random coalitions, offering to each (and asking from each one’s participating agents) the
minimum possible resource quantity (= 1).
In each iteration, responders receive the proposals in which they are involved, and decide, for each
proposal in turn whether to accept it (invest the resource quantity) or reject it (offering nothing). OVERPRO
employs a parameter c ∈ (0,1), so that an agent rejects a proposed coalition C if she identifies a non-
profitable (bad) topic in which at least c of the agents in C are significant. The intuition behind the
employment of parameter c is that it suffices to observe a certain percentage of agents of a proposed
coalition in a “non-profitable” topic in order to reject it. Parameter c can have different values at differ-
ent iterations, so we refer to its value at iteration t as ct . As agents make more observations, and thus
become more confident about their beliefs over time, they gradually become more strict about who they
cooperate with, and thus the value of ct decreases with t. If a proposal to form coalition C is not rejected,
then it is checked whether there is a profitable (good) topic in which at least (1− ct) of the agents in
C are significant. Since responder j has to split her resources among the proposals she has received,
a proposal associated with a profitable topic like the one described above, is an item of a KNAPSACK
problem that j has to solve where the value of the item is r j,C/∑m∈C rm,C · (β jk,′gain′−β jk,′loss′): this stands
for the profit portion of j, multiplied by the profitability of the corresponding topic. The weight of the
item is the requested quantity r j,C, and the constraint is that responder j cannot invest more than r j
in total. Thus, responder j accepts the coalitions which correspond to the items given by solving the
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KNAPSACK problem, while she rejects the rest. Despite that KNAPSACK is an NP-Hard problem, the
dynamic programming pseudopolynomial algorithm [20], which we used in our experiments, often ad-
mits not excessive running times, while an alternative is to use an FPTAS. After the decisions regarding
the coalitions identified by profitable topics are made, the responder replies positively (if there is suffi-
cient resource quantity) to an offer which has been neither accepted nor rejected (no relevant information
found) if either the requested quantity is 1, or, if not, with probability ct (in an exploratory sense).
The training of LDA, and thus consequently that of online LDA, takes polynomial time in the number
of documents and topics [4]. Despite the fact that the number of documents depends on the resource
quantities of the agents, which are numeric values and thus imply pseudopolynomial complexity, in
practice the number of documents formed is far from the worst case, which can be attested by our
experimental results. The “exploitation” part of OVERPRO takes polynomial time in the number of topics
and agents, while the exploration part, which is independent of OVERPRO and can be replaced by one’s
choosing, takes pseudopolynomial time, as it linearly depends on the proposer’s resource quantity.
Furthermore, topics convergence is guaranteed [12] if κ ∈ (0.5,1] (online LDA parameter). There-
fore, assigning such a value to κ and letting the resource portion dedicated by an agent for exploration
decrease over time, we have as a corollary that the actions of the agents employing OVERPRPO converge.
6 Reinforcement Learning for OCF
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on (decentralized) multiagent learning for overlapping
coalition formation under uncertainty not restricted in the context of Threshold Task Games [24], and
thus there is no algorithm to use as a means for comparison. To this end, we have developed a a Greedy
top-k algorithm and a Q-learning style [33, 8] one, and use these as baselines.
6.1 Greedy top-k algorithm
An agent that uses our Greedy top-k algorithm maintains the k most profitable coalitions she has ob-
served, along with their values, and the resources offered by participating agents. A proposer makes k
proposals, one for each of the top-k coalitions. The resource ri,C offered to coalition C by proposer i is
proportional to the amount i previously offered to C and C’s corresponding value derived by applying
the softmax function [29] over the maintained values (observed utilities) of the top-k coalitions; while i
asks from agent j ∈C an amount equal to ri,C, multiplied by the ratio of their previous offerings (with
j’s being on the numerator and i’s on the denominator) and a random value in U(0.9,1.1). The approach
to the exploitation-vs-exploration problem is exactly the same as in OVERPRO, and thus the zt parameter
is also employed here. A responder j adds a proposal to the input of a KNAPSACK problem if at least
(1−ct) of the agents in the corresponding (proposed) coalition appear in one of the top-k coalitions. The
value of the KNAPSACK item is equal to the sum of the values of the coalitions in which the agents of the
proposed coalition were identified, multiplied by r j,C/∑m∈C rm,C. The weight of the corresponding item
is, naturally, the requested quantity r j,C. A responder accepts a proposal which was not included in the
input of the KNAPSACK instance, and for which there is sufficient remaining resource, if the requested
quantity is 1, or else with probability ct .
6.2 Q-learning for OCF
An agent that uses our Q-learning algorithm employs two distinct kinds of Q-values. The first one,
denoted as Qa, maintains agent-level values; while the second, denoted as Qs, maintains coalition size-
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level values. Employing two different sets of Q-values is necessary, since the alternative of maintaining a
Q-value for every possible coalition requires exponential space in the number of the agents (rendering the
problem practically intractable in large settings). Agent i maintains for each agent j ∈C \ i a Qia, j value,
and for each h∈ {1, . . . ,n−1} a Qis,h value; keeping a Qis,h value for h= n is redundant since the decision-
maker always includes herself in a coalition. Furthermore, a learning rate δt ∈ (0,1) is employed [29], as
is common in Q-learning, where t is the game iteration. After C 3 i, is formed and coalitional value uC is
observed, agent i updates her Q-values as follows:
Qia, j← Qia, j +δt · (uC−Qia, j) ∀ j ∈C \ i
Qis,h← Qis,h+δt · (uC−Qis,h) where h = |C|−1
A proposer employing our Q-learning algorithm iteratively selects some quantity of her resource,
at random, to offer to a coalition, until it is depleted. Then, at each iteration, the size of the coalition
to propose (excluding herself) is selected using the softmax function over the Qis values, and afterwards
the agents to include in the coalition are selected using the softmax function over the Qia values. The
proposer asks from each member in C the same quantity she has offered to C multiplied by U(0.9,1.1).
Exploration is employed in the same way as in the other methods.
Responder j has to solve a KNAPSACK problem, where a proposal regarding coalition C is given as
input only if ∑l∈C\ j Q
j
a,l is positive, with its value being ∑l∈C\ j Q
j
a,l· r j,C/∑m∈C rm,C and its weight r j,C.
If ∑l∈C\ j Q
j
a,l is negative, j accepts (if she can afford it) joining C if the requested quantity is 1, or else
with probability ct .
7 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated OVERPRO’s effectiveness and robustness in environments with 50 and 250 agents. Agent
resource quantities were generated from {475, . . . ,525} uniformly at random. The RRs were 500 for
n= 50, and 20,000 for n= 250, where the value of each RR was generated fromN (0,1002). We added
stochasticity in our setting, so that with probability 5% the value of a coalition, as resulted by applying
RRs, is multiplied by a factor generated from N (0,52). Every game ran for I = 1000 iterations, and
thus, agent i can observe at most ri · 1000 documents. Coding was in Python 3 and online LDA was
implemented as in [12].4 The same exploration rate zt was set for all methods, decreasing quadratically
from 1 to 10−3. The value of ct decreases linearly, for every method as well, from 1 to 0.5. We tested
OVERPRO, which requires K (number of topics),5 τ0 and κ (that determine the impact ρ = (τ0+ t)−κ
of a batch of documents on the topics), and Q-learning, which requires δt , for a number of different
parameters; while for Greedy top-k we set values of k equal to the number of topics K for OVERPRO.
The value of ε used in OVERPRO was equal to the vocabulary’s length raised to −1, i.e., (n+ 2)−1.
Experiments ran on a grid (each execution instance ran sequentially) with 4GB RAM 2.6GHz computers.
In Table 1 we present for n = 50 the average: social welfare (total utility) earned in a game (sw);
number of coalitions in which an agent participates in a round (participation); and game completion time
per agent per iteration.
As observed in Table 1, OVERPRO vastly outperforms both Greedy top-k and Q-learning in terms
of social welfare. For the best set of parameters of OVERPRO, 〈K = 15,τ0 = 200,κ = 0.9〉, the average
4https://github.com/blei-lab/onlineldavb
5In some LDA implementations the value of K is automatically derived [30], but we use the standard online LDA algorithm,
which requires the value of K as a parameter.
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Table 1: Results (averages over 75 runs) for 50 agents and different values of 〈K,τ0,κ〉 for OVERPRO, k
for Greedy top-k, and and δt for Q-learning. Participation and time are per agent per iteration t (there is
a unique proposer in t).
n = 50 sw (·103) participation time (sec)
〈10,100,0.7〉 95.60 24.91 0.525
〈10,200,0.9〉 117.27 24.97 0.528
〈15,100,0.7〉 108.59 25.09 0.540
〈15,200,0.9〉 119.47 25.17 0.543
k = 10 34.54 37.70 0.363
k = 15 51.72 37.64 0.366
δt = 0.95t 14.53 38.15 0.009
δt = 0.99t 10.69 38.08 0.009
social welfare earned in a game was more than double of that earned when the best alternative was
employed, which is Greedy top-15, since 119.47/51.72= 2.3. Thus, we can conclude that a stochasticity
probability even as low as 5% can have a largely negative impact on Greedy top-k. On the other hand,
this demonstrates the robustness of OVERPRO. Q-learning, for both values of δt , performed very poorly,
as in both cases the social welfare was not far above zero: 14.53 for δt = 0.95 and 10.69 for δt = 0.99.
This suggests deficiency in matching good agent-level Q-values to coalition size-level ones, and thus
unsuitability of Q-learning approaches, when Q-values for every coalition cannot be maintained. For
both 10 and 15 topics, the social welfare was better for 〈τ0 = 200,κ = 0.9〉 than for 〈τ0 = 100,κ = 0.7〉.
Since τ0 and κ determine the impact that a batch of documents has on the formation of the topics,
ρt = (τ0 + t)−κ can be interpreted as a learning rate. Now, higher values of τ0 and κ result in smaller
values of ρt . Therefore, it can be conjectured that lower learning rates are preferred over higher ones.
Despite the better social welfare performance of OVERPRO against any of the alternatives, the av-
erage agent participation per iteration is lower when OVERPRO is employed, as seen in Table 1. In par-
ticular, an agent using OVERPRO joins about 25 coalitions per iteration, while one using either Greedy
top-k or Q-learning joins about 38. By the end of a game an agent employing OVERPRO will have trained
her online LDA with more than 24.9k documents, since one coalition corresponds to one document, an
agent participates in at least 24.91 coalitions in a round
(
value for 〈K = 10,τ0 = 100,κ = 0.7〉
)
, and
I=1000. Notice that the number of coalitions in which an agent participates when OVERPRO is employed
is much smaller than her resource quantity, which is at least 475 >> 25.17 (= max OVERPRO participa-
tion). Thus, the number of documents is much smaller than the maximum possible, which implies that
the pseudopolynomial complexity related to the number of documents does not have an actual impact.
The time taken per agent per iteration is less than 0.55 sec for OVERPRO and 0.37 sec for Greedy top-k,
while it is about two orders of magnitude lower for Q-learning.
Now, one cannot draw accurate conclusions regarding the real power of an agent decision-making
algorithm relying solely on social welfare. For instance, when more coalitions form, this will likely have
a positive impact on social welfare—but rational agents aim to maximize their own utility. Therefore,
we define efficiency as the ratio of social welfare (total utility) to total resource quantity invested by all
agents in every coalition in a round. This efficiency metric is natural, as it takes the focus away from
social welfare.
It can be observed in Fig. 2 that OVERPRO, for n = 50 (orange bars), outperforms both Greedy top-
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Figure 2: Average efficiency defined as the ratio of social welfare to total resource quantity invested by
all agents. For OVERPRO the values of K (number of topics), and respectively for Greedy top-k the values
of k, are denoted on the left of each bar. Results are averages over all rounds over multiple runs: 75 runs
for n = 50, and 30 for n = 250.
k and Q-learning in terms of efficiency. In particular, the highest efficiency value, which appears for
〈K = 10,τ0 = 200,κ = 0.9〉, is more than double of the best efficiency value of the alternatives, observed
for Greedy top-10 (the former being over 0.06, and the latter lower than 0.03). We can thus conclude
that agents employing OVERPRO are more efficient in terms of earning utility (as a function of resources
invested), as they focus more on coalitions identified as profitable.
Now, as depicted by the blue bars in Fig. 2, OVERPRO achieves even better efficiency for n = 250
than for n = 50, and it thus appears to effectively exploit the richer emerging collaboration structure.
Moreover, we observed through experimentation that the number of topics K should increase sublinearly
to n, and we have thus used 15 and 20 as its values. We set the values of k for Greedy top-k accordingly.
We observe that for τ0 = 200 and κ = 0.9, for K set to either 15 or 20, the achieved efficiency is over 0.1,
thus vastly outperforming the RL algorithms, whose efficiency is always lower than 0.03; and at the same
time supporting our conjecture that lowering learning rates are associated with increased performance.
Agents employing Q-learning performed better for n = 250 than for n = 50 in terms of efficiency, but
their performance was still very far below that of the ones using OVERPRO. The efficiency of Greedy
top-k deteriorated for n = 250 (dropping even below 0.02 for k = 20), as it fails to identify and exploit
patterns in the collaboration structure, while it is more difficult for the method to identify profitable
coalitions in this larger setting. Each agent using OVERPRO had trained her online LDA model with
more than 33.7k documents (coalitions) in total, at the end of a game. The OVERPRO running time for
n = 250, was ∼ 1.15 sec per agent per iteration.
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8 Discussion
One of the aims of this paper is to provide insights towards new research directions. In particular, this
work diverges from the standard RL/MDPs paradigm used for multiagent learning in games. As such,
we expect that it will raise intriguing questions, and bears the potential for the development of exciting
new theory to be applied to challenging problems. It is, for one, interesting to study the effect of adopting
PTMs for multiagent learning. Taking a reverse point of view, it is of interest of examine the effect that
specific multiagent environments can have on PTM properties. For instance, the convergence property of
online LDA tranfers “for free” to OVERPRO, but in certain environments, or under additional assumptions
on the structure of the game, the convergence rate might be different.
Moreover, a somewhat “orthogonal” contribution in this paper was the introduction of the novel
concept of Relational Rules (RRs), which consist a natural scheme for representing synergies in over-
lapping settings. As such, pursuing their further study could lead to new stability results for overlapping
cooperative games.
Indeed, the concept of stability in games with overlapping coalitions is quite elaborate and different
than the disjoint coalitional ones, since it is not just the membership of an agent in a coalition that
matters, but the degree by which she participates in that; and since the number of different coalition
structures cannot be enumerated in such settings [6]. Additionally, in such settings, it is not just agents
or coalitions that can deviate, but entire coalition structures, since agents can withdraw just a portion
of their resource from the formed coalitions. All these render the study of stability challenging in OCF
domains. Though we did not pursue the study of OCF stability in this paper, it would be interesting
to define and study stability concepts that take into account agent preferences regarding collaboration
structures learned using our method.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a novel approach for multiagent learning in cooperative game environments, where
probabilistic topic modeling is exploited. Furthermore, this is the first work to tackle overlapping coali-
tion formation under uncertainty, where the uncertainty is on the relations entailing synergies among the
agents. To this end, we first proposed Relational Rules, a representation scheme which extends MC-nets
to cooperative games with overlapping coalitions; and then showed how to use online LDA to implicitly
learn the agents’ synergies described by (unknown) RRs. Simulations confirm the method’s effectiveness.
As immediate future work, we intend to test these ideas in non-transferable utility settings. More-
over, we would like to apply our method to non-cooperative environments. Naturally, this would require
adjustments to the “vocabulary” used in “documents” representing coalitions. Finally, we intend to apply
alternative PTM algorithms, to this or different game theoretic settings.
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